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Expected prices for storable commodities often lie below spot prices plus interest and
marginal storage charges. Recently this gap has been explained as the value of a call
option held by a representative storer whenever a positive probability exists that stocks
could dwindle to zero. However, the probability of an aggregate stock-out is effectively
zero in most markets most of the time. This paper presents an alternative model that
explains the gap as an equilibrium between fundamentalstradersand noise traders.Ap-
plications of the model suggest thatrationalagentsmake up 84 percent of the U.S. copper
market, and more than 95 percent of the corn and wheat markets.
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Empirical evidence has been unable to confirm
that all economic agents act in accordance
with the rational expectations hypothesis. (See
Irwin and Thraen for a review.) Difficulties in
forming expectations arise when forecasters
attempt to discriminate between fundamental
market information and random uninformative
noise, The human capital needed to do so is
costly, and many simple approximations exist
as cheap alternatives. For many agents quasi-
rational (time series) expectations may be the
cost-effective choice.
The noise trader literature (e.g. Black; De
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman; Cut-
ler, Poterba, and Summers) stipulates that mar-
kets can deviate from their rationally expected
equilibrium for extensive periods due to the
existence of quasi-rational agents, noise trad-
ers.’ Also known as chartists, noise traders
may be responsible for speculative bubbles, as
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1The terms “noise” and “quasi-rational” will be
used interchangeably throughoutwhen applied to trad-
ing behavior.
demonstrated by Frankel and Froot (1986,
1990). They are also growing in number, in
the form of commodity pool managers using
positive feedback trading strategies (Sanders,
Irwin, and Leuthold). If these traders have suf-
ficient capital reserves, they may not be driven
out of the market in the short run. The char-
acter of market equilibrium depends on the
number of quasi-rational agents and whether
fully rational agents adjust their behavior be-
cause quasi-rational agents exist.
This paper presents a theory of the supply
of storage for a commodity that is traded by
rational and quasi-rational agents. In the het-
erogeneous expectations context, rational trad-
ers must account for the equilibrium effect of
noise traders on the market. The result is ra-
tional expectations that vary positively with
aggregate stocks, in accord with established
observation. Empirical estimation using two
hundred monthly observations in the U.S. cop-
per market validates the theory. The copper
market is a useful example for testing the
model because its supply of storage curve is
highly variable (e.g., Thurman, Brennan
(1991), Pindyck) and because good monthly
stock-holding data are available. The model is462 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
then applied to the market for two agricultural
commodities-corn and wheat.
The model is presented as an alternative to
the Kaldor-Working convenience yield hy-
pothesis and more recent theories of storage
and price dynamics. Its purpose is not to de-
bunk those theories but to analyze heteroge-
neity as a source of price movement. The
model is intentionally simple and restrictive to
focus all the more clearly on the topic at hand.
Noise Traders and Heterogeneous
Expectations
The heterogeneous storage model is best de-
veloped in contrast to the representative agent
rational expectations storage model (Samuel-
son, Williams and Wright, and Deaton and La-
roque (1992, 1996)). If all agents are fully in-
formed, fully rational, risk neutral, and
identical, then no speculative trades will ever
be executed because all agents will value com-
modities equally. Expected price will always
exceed current price by the full costs of car-
rying stocks (including marginal physical stor-
age costs and interest) whenever stocks are
held.
The representative agent storage model
usually assumes full rationality in both spot
and futures markets. Tomek and Gray and Zu-
lauf et al. have provided empirical evidence
that futures prices cannot be distinguished em-
pirically from rational expectations of future
spot prices. Therefore, futures prices may of-
ten be treated as rationally expected prices.
However, if some agents form quasi-ratio-
nal expectations, the market’s dynamics
change. Quasi-rational expectations have been
studied by Nerlove; Nerlove, Grether, and Car-
valho; Frechette; and Chavas. These expecta-
tions have been used in econometric analysis
for many years, most recently by Foster and
Mwanaumo; Thijssen; White and Shideed;
and Winter-Nelson.
In general, quasi-rational expectations are
simple time series approximations to fully ra-
tional expectations. They are approximations
in the following sense. When agents make de-
cisions based on forecasts, they prefer unbi-
ased forecasts; however, they are unwilling to
incur the costs of generating them (assuming
it is possible to do so). Instead, they use a
simpler, cheaper alternative with the hope that
it will not be too biased to help in the deci-
sion-making process. The unbiased forecast is
the rational expectation, and the simpler,
cheaper one is usually a quasi-rational expec-
tation. When decision-makers approximate the
rational expectation with a quasi-rational one,
they are expecting the error to be small
enough that they are unwilling to pay for a
better approximation.
Conventional wisdom says that quasi-ratio-
nal traders will lose money on average and
exit from the market in the long run. However,
in the short run these traders are known to
exist in great numbers. Their pockets are deep
enough and their numbers are replenished
quickly enough that they are not driven out of
the market, even in the long run. For example,
Chavas estimated an aggregate price expecta-
tion function using a weighted average of dif-
ferent expectations. He estimated the propor-
tion of quasi-rational producers in the U.S.
pork industry to have averaged approximately
73 percent over the 1960–96 period. The stay-
ing power of quasi-rational agents in com-
modity markets means that a new model of
price formation must be considered and must
allow for heterogeneous expectations.
The inclusion of quasi-rational agents gen-
erates an important logical inconsistency that
Chavas did not address. Assume one group of
traders forms fully rational expectations and a
second group forms quasi-rational expecta-
tions. Let the spot price at time t be denoted
p,, and let the rational (mathematical) expec-
tation of p, formed at time t – 1 be denoted
EP~. Let the quasi-rational expectation of p~
(formed at time t – 1) be denoted p:. Trade
occurs between the groups if EP~# p:. For the
purposes of illustration, let r,-, be the interest
rate and K be marginal physical storage costs,
and assume EP, < (1 + r~-l)p~-l + K < p:.
In this case, the rational group wants to sell
the commodity, which looks expensive to
them. They sell the commodity to anyone who
will buy, until price falls to (EPt – K)/( 1 +
r,., ). Simultaneously, the quasi-rational group
wants to buy the commodity, which looksFrechette: Supply of Storage under Heterogeneous Expectations 463
cheap to them. They buy from anyone who
will sell, until p~-l = (pf – K)/(l + r~.l). A
logical inconsistency results because there is
no limit to the size of the net position (stocks,
plus long futures, minus short futures) taken
by each trader, and no equilibrium exists.
The logical inconsistency can be eliminated
by dropping the assumption of risk neutrality.
As Black discussed, noise trading itself adds
a source of risk to the market and all market
participants must contend with it. Traders may
be risk neutral toward demand shocks and oth-
er fundamental risks because they can be
hedged in a straightforward manner. However,
they are most probably not risk neutral toward
the risks associated with noise trading. There-
fore, the size of short or long positions is lim-
ited by the differential between EP, and pf, the
risk preferences of traders, and the nature of
noise trader risk.
Consider two representative groups of trad-
ers: one forms expectations rationally and one
quasi-rationally. Assume that futures markets
are efficient in the sense that stocks and long
futures generate equal stochastic returns and
that, therefore, stocks and futures are perfect
substitutes. Pure hedgers are not considered
because their net exposure to the market is
minimal by definition. Speculators invest in
stocks and futures based on the rate of return
they expect to receive. Expected profits induce
them to store the commodity and/or buy fu-
tures, but their speculative position is con-
strained by risk aversion.
Assume further that quasi-rational agents
make up a constant fraction, a, of market par-
ticipants and that rational agents make up the
remaining fraction, 1 – a, with O < a < 1. If
the total number of traders is N, then there are
aN quasi-rational traders. Let the stocks held
by quasi-rational agents be denoted SP!,, and
let the size of their net long position in the
futures market be denoted L~I,. By definition,
each quasi-rational trader holds (s?!, + L~I,)/
aN units of stocks and long futures, which de-
fines his or her net long position overall in the
market.
In equilibrium this quantity depends on the
expected rate of return. Let K be constant mar-
ginal storage costs and r,-, be the discount
rate. The quasi-rational expected rate of return
is then (pf – K)/( 1 + r,. ,)p,.,. As developed
by Lintner (1969), let q(.) be a speculative de-
mand function relating individual speculative
holdings to the expected rate of return, and let
Q(x) = q(x)N. The form of q(.) is based on
risk preferences, and if traders are risk averse
then its properties can be summarized as q(1)
= O; q ‘(x) > O; and q“(x) <0. In equilibrium
q[(p: – KY(1 + r,. ,)P,.l] units are held by
each quasi-rational investor. Thus,
(1) ~, = ~Q[(p: – K)/(l + r[-l)pl-l]. s:!, + L,-{
Similarly, the net position held by rational
agents, s:., + LI_,, depends on the same spec-
ulative demand function, Q(.), applied to the
rationally expected rate of return:
(2) s;–, + L:–,
= (1 – a)Q[(EPt – K)/(l + r,-, )p,-l].
That is, rational optimizing agents choose to
hold stocks, long futures, and/or short futures
that add up to the expression on the right-hand
side of equation (2).
In equilibrium the total supply of stocks,
s~_,, is equal to the sum over the two sources
of storage demand, St., = sf:, + s;.,. Every
futures contract has long and short sides, and
opposing sides net out to zero by definition
(L?! , + L:-, = O). Other ways to hedge (aside
from futures) include options, contracts, in-
dexing, etc. These methods are not considered
in the paper because they do not serve to elu-
cidate the point. They can all be combined and
they all zero out as futures do.
Therefore combining equations (1) and (2):
(3) (s:!,+ L~:,) + (S;_,+ ~_, )
= (s::,+ s:., ) + (L~I1 + ~-1) = St-,
yields an expression for the equilibrium level
of aggregate stocks:
(4) st_l = aQ[(p~ – K)/(l + r,., )p,., ]
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which must be nonnegative at all times. Solv-
ing equation (4) for the rational expectation,
EP,, yields a supply of storage curve repre-
senting the intertemporal heterogeneous ex-
pectations equilibrium:
(5) EP, = (1 + r,.l)p,-l
XQ-l{[s,_, –aQ((p; –K)
+(1 +r,_l)p,_l)]/(l –a)} +K.
Expected price covers storage costs, but the
expected rate of return depends on the position
held by noise traders. Notice that stocks and
expected price are positively related, ceteris
paribus, in accord with earlier models and es-
tablished empirical fact (Keynes, Kaldor,
Working-1948, 1949; Brennan—1958; Tel-
ser; etc.).
The complete behavioral system describing
the market includes equation (5), the rational
expectations assumption, and four additional
equations:
CurrentConsumption: c, = ~(p,, . . .) + shock
at time t
CurrentSupply: q; = S(infomation avail_
able at time t – 1) +
shock at time t
Quasi-rational p; = O(information
Expectations: available at time t – 1)
Storage: St= st_, + q: — ct.
The complete system can be solved and sim-
ulated using the methodology of Williams and
Wright (1991), Deaton and Laroque (1992,
1996), or Miranda (1998) who consider the
representative agent storage model under risk
neutrality.
This supply of storage curve (5) is an equi-
librium relationship among utility maximizing
traders. In contrast, supply of storage curves
that require the existence of convenience yield
are not based formally on utility maximiza-
tion. Additional explanations of supply of
storage curve behavior include transformation
costs (Wright and Williams; Benirschka and
Binkley; Brennan, Wright, and Williams) and
uncertainty (Heinkel, Howe, and Hughes; Mil-
onas and Thomadakis; and Susmel and
Thompson), but their importance in price dy-
namics remains under debate (Frechette and
Fackler), All explanations based on economic
theory must be considered and their relative
merits determined. To that end, the properties
of this model can now be explored.
If noise traders sell stocks, then rational
traders buy them and hold a net long position,
which means:
st_, – aQ[(p; – K)/(l + rf.l)p,-, ] >0,
so (EP, – K)/(l + r,_l)p,_l > 1,
from equation (5). On the other hand, if noise
traders buy enough stocks, then rational trad-
ers may hold a net short position, which
means:
s,_, – aQ[(p~ – K)/(l + r,-, )p,-, ] <0,
so (EP, – K)/(l + r,., )pt.l < 1.
In the limiting case of a = O, all agents are
rational, and Ptis zero in equilibrium. Q(.) is
zero if (EP, – K)/( 1 + r~-,)pt-, < 1 and infinity
if (EP, – K)/( 1 + rt-,)p~., > 1. Equilibrium is
obtained only when (EPt – K)/( 1 + rt-,)p~.,
. 1.
Now assume a is between zero and one. Let
the rationally expected excess rate of return be
denoted p, = (EP, – K)/( 1 + r,-, )p,-, – 1. That
is,
(6) EP, = (1 + p,)(l + r,., )p,-, + K.
If p, is negative, then expected prices do not
exhibit full carrying costs. Using equation (5)
the value of p, is:
(7) p,= Q-’ { [s,_, – aQ[(p; – K)/(l + r,-, )p,-, ]]
+(1-a)} -1,
which measures the expected rate of return
earned by rational agents above and beyond
interest charges and the marginal physical cost
of storage. Rational agents buy stocks long
when the rate is positive and sell stocks shortFrechette: Supply of Storage under Heterogeneous Expectations 465
when it is negative. Rational agents do not
participate in the market when the rate is zero.
Now consider the effect of p, on the futures
price profile (i.e., the constellation of futures
prices). When p, is positive the futures price
profile slopes up. When p, <0, futures prices
do not cover the costs of carry. When p, <
–(rt_,p,_, + K)/(l + r,.,)p,-,, prices are ex-
pected to fall; the futures price profile slopes
down, causing the empirical phenomenon
known as backwardation.
Backwardations
A backwardation occurs when the futures
price is lower than the spot price. It is an ex-
treme example of what is more commonly ob-
served—futures prices that fail to cover full
carrying costs. The latter can best be described
as a relative backwardation. Examples of
backwardation and relative backwardation are
both commonly observed in the copper mar-
ket. Backwardations and relative backwarda-
tions in grain crops often occur across crop
years. They also tend to occur late in the crop
year when stocks have dwindled substantially
from their harvest time peaks. If there is no
storage across crop years, then this model is
inappropriate for annual grain crop models.
For semi-storable commodities a shrinkage
factor can be incorporated into the discount
rate, as done by Deaton and Laroque.
Economists have long debated the cause of
backwardations and relative backwardations in
futures and forward markets. Keynes argued
that they are due to a risk premium and Kaldor
believed that stocks yield a benefit to stock
holders to offset expected loss. Working
(1948, 1949) developed Kaldor’s idea into a
theory of convenience yield that has been ac-
cepted widely for the last fifty years.
Recent studies (Wright and Williams; Be-
nirschka and Binkley; Brennan, Williams, and
Wright) have suggested that backwardations
are an artifact of aggregation over product
space or of mismeasurement due to transpor-
tation costs. Backwardations have also been
treated as call options when stock-outs are
possible (Heinkel, Howe, and Hughes; Mil-
onas and Thomadakis; and Susmel and
Thompson); however, backwardations and rel-
ative backwardations are observed even when
the probability of an aggregate stock-out is ef-
fectively zero. Here a new theory will be de-
veloped, based most closely on Keynes’, as-
suming that stocks and futures are perfect
investment substitutes and assuming hetero-
geneous expectations and risk averse prefer-
ences.
Backwardations have been linked empiri-
cally to low stock levels (Working-1948,
1949; Telser, Thurman, Pindyck, Frechette).
This correlation can be verified by calculating
the derivative of the expected excess rate of
return (p,) with respect to the stock level (s,.,).
Starting with equation (7), and noting that











_ (P: – O%, /dst-,11 (1 + r,-, )p~-l “
Let c, be consumption and D(cJ = p, be the
inverse demand curve for the commodity.
Then the derivative simplifies to:
dpt 1 aQ’((lfi:P1-J —= (1 – a)Q’(1 + p,) – ds,-, (1 + r,_,)p~_,(l – a)Q’(1 + p,)
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aQ’((lE&J[%E
.D’(c,_, ).(–1) – (p~– K) D’(c,_l) .(-l)
dp, 1 1
~ = (1 – a)Q’(1 + p,) - (1 + r,_,)p~_l(l – a)Q’(1 + p,)
and becomes:
dpt = 1 [aQ(,l!f;_:p,_) ][ *I D’(c,_I)/(l + rl-, )p$-, p: – K – p,_,
(8) —
ds,., (1 - a)Q’(1 + p,) - (1 - a)Q’(1 + p,)
If the inverse demand curve slopes down
[D ‘(.) < O] and agents are risk averse [Q’(o)
> O], then the sign of the derivative in equa-
tion (8) is positive if and only if the numerator
of the second term is less than 1. This condi-
tion will be tested empirically and validated in
the empirical section below. Therefore, it can
be concluded that dp,/ds,_, is positive.z
The model explains why price expectations
are low when stocks are low, ceter-is paribu,s,
and rise as stock levels rise. However, it re-
mains unclear whether the model predicts rel-
ative backwardations. The next step is to an-
alyze stock levels in more detail when pt< 0.
When p, < 0, rational agents sell stocks
short. Quasi-rational agents buy stocks and
borrow stocks by selling futures to maintain
the equilibrium described by equation (4). Ra-
tional traders can owe stocks to quasi-rational
ones in a way that is disallowed by the single
representative agent model. Using equation
(4), this condition can be written as follows:
[s,_, – aQ((p: – K)/(l + r,_,)p,_, )]
+(l–a) <O, or
‘9)‘t-l< aQl(l~i-lLl
If inequality (9) is rewritten as an equality, it
2Changes in stocks depend on changes in both
consumption and production. The above derivation ac-
counts only for consumption-driven changes in stocks.
The second term of equation (8) equals zero for pro-
duction-drive changes. The result leaves the first term
unchanged and the derivative still positive, assuming
Q’(.) is positive.
can be solved implicitly for the critical point
(st, ) at which rational agents take a net zero
position in the market and all stocks are held
by quasi-rational agents:
‘t=aQl(lf
If s,_, < s:,, then rational agents sell stocks
short. If s,-, > s:,, then rational agents take
a long position in stocks. Long and short po-
sitions are not allowed in the representative
agent model.
Under condition (9), quasi-rational agents
have an incentive to keep a long position in
stocks because p; exceeds the costs of carry.
At the same time, rational agents have an in-
centive to keep a short position in stocks be-
cause EP, is less than the costs of carry. The
equilibrium size of the short and long posi-
tions depends on how averse agents are to the
risks involved. When p~is negative in equilib-
rium, stocks are low and EP~(and the futures
price) is below the full costs of carry, in ac-
cord with established observation. Therefore,
the model explains observed relative back-
wardations.
The opposite case, p, >0, is equally com-
mon and might be called fcwwardation. For-
wardation is also common in the copper mar-
ket. Forwardation and relative backwardation
are sometimes called “contango,” to distin-
guish them from backwardation, but the con-
tango distinction is not meaningful. More in-
sight is gained by classifying backwardations
and relative backwardations together. The dis-Frechette: Supply of Storage under Heterogeneous Expectations 467
tinction between them and forwardations is
drawn at the full cost of carry.
All three are determined endogenously as
a consequence of risk preferences. Risk pref-
erences are embodied in p, through the spec-
ulative demand function, q(.). The speculative
demand function approach is fully consistent
with portfolio management and diversification
models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (Sharpe, Lintner (1965)). According to
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the q(.) func-
tion may shift if additional commodities with
correlated prices are included in the trader’s
investment portfolio. Portfolios of goods are
not the focus here; rather, the risk due to noise
trading in a single market provides the impetus
for study. Heterogeneous expectations are ex-
plored in hopes that they will facilitate a richer
understanding of commodity markets and pro-
vide a realistic explanation of futures market




The U.S. copper market serves as a good ex-
ample for testing the heterogeneous expecta-
tions storage model because of the high qual-
ity and frequency of stocks data collected for
the market. Data are observed monthly and
200 observations cover January 1975 through
October 1991. More recent observations were
subject to revision at the time of analysis and
are therefore omitted. Earlier observations are
contaminated by the government buffer stock
holding program that ended in 1974. The
quantity of copper extracted is represented by
the American Bureau of Metal Statistics
(ABMS) measure of U.S. refined copper ex-
traction, calculated in kilotons, as found in the
Commodity Research Bureau’s Commodity
Yearbook. Copper stocks are represented as
the sum of U.S. refined copper stocks (ABMS)
and Commodity Exchange (COMEX) ware-
house stocks, measured in kilotons. Copper
consumption is measured as new extraction
plus disappearance from inventories. The mea-
sures of extraction and inventories are used in
Thurman (1988) and are also reported in Com-
modity Yearbook.
Copper prices are American Metals Mar-
kets producer prices from Commodi~ Year-
book for refined wirebar copper, delivered to
U.S. locations, adjusted into 1982 cents using
the producer price index (PPI) for industrial
commodities, which is taken from Survey of
Current Business. The time index, t, equals
one in January 1975. Two mine strikes oc-
curred during the sample, from July–August
1977 and from July–November 1980.
Other data include the index of industrial
production from Survey of Current Business,
copper scrap prices from the United States Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (#u 102301), and an
aluminum price series spliced together at the
December 1980 observation from the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics primary alu-
minum series (#u 10220101 ) and primary un-
alloyed ingot aluminum series (#u102201 17).
TWO observations were linearly interpolated
for the first aluminum series. The price series
were normalized by the PPI for industrial
commodities. The interest rate series is the an-
nualized nominal prime rate taken from Sur-
vey of Current Business, adjusted to a monthly
real rate by the PPI for industrial commodities.
The three most important variables are
price, consumption, and stocks. Price has a
sample mean of 97.43 cents and sample stan-
dard deviation of 22.72 cents. Consumption
has a sample mean of 125.36 kilotons per
month and a sample standard deviation of
33.06 kilotons. Stocks have a sample mean of
416.95 kilotons and a sample standard devia-
tion of 252.98 kilotons. Futures prices are not
used because monthly contracts were not in-
stituted until the mid- 1990s, making monthly
analysis impossible.
Quarterly data for the corn and wheat mar-
kets from December 1935 to December 1992
included prices in dollars and stocks in thou-
sands of bushels from the USDA and interest
rates on three-month T-bills from the Federal
Reserve. The PPI for all commodities was
used as the deflator with a 1982 base year.
Empirical Specijcation
For empirical purposes assume the utility
function for each representative trader is of the468 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
negative exponential form, U(y) = –k
exp( – tly). Let w = &r2, a measure of risk aver-
sion. Then following Lintner (1969) the spec-
ulative demand is:
(lo) Q(x) = 2(x – 1)/p,-,q, and
(11) Q-’(y) = 1 + qp,.,y/2.
The factor of two is needed because there are
two representative traders. The expression for
p, simplifies from (7) to:












(14) p,= mPt-lst-1 ~+—–
l–a 2(1–a) *((l:il:t-)
Equation (14) shows that the slope of the
supply of storage curve should depend on
price (p,. ,), the rational share of the market (1
– a), and risk preferences (embodied by q).
Returns to storage also depend on the qua-
si-rational expectation, pf. For estimation pur-
poses, quasi-rational price expectations are as-
sumed to depend on four lags of price as
follows:
(15) p: = e. + elp,., + e2pt_2+ e3pt.3 + e4pt_,.
The (3,were estimated separately by Ordinary
Least Squares.s
The empirical specification of the supply of
storage is based on the integral form of equa-
tion (6). The integral form is the appropriate
one here because copper is mined nearly con-
tinuously. A discrete difference equation
might impose step function transitions im-
properly between levels of p, (Day, sections
3.5 and 3.9). To calculate the integral, first put
(6) into continuous form:
Edp = [(r + p + pr)p + K]dt.
Then add a stochastic term, udB, with B rep-
resenting Brownian motion:
dp = [(r + p + pr)p + K]dt + udB.
Define w as a random walk with dw = udB,
distributed Normal(O, uzdt). Finally, integrate
and write in discrete terms for estimation pur-
poses:
(16) p, = A exp[(r,., + (1 + r,-, )pt)tl
K — + wt.
r,_l + (1 + r,_,)p~
Parameter A is an unknown constant of inte-
gration, and the small order effects of
differential changes in r,-, and p, are assumed
to be negligible. By construction, the stochas-
tic term, w,, is 1(1) with Aw, distributed Nor-
mal(O, u*). The spurious regression phenom-
enon can generate bias in the standard errors
of parameter estimates when stochastic trends
sThe 0, are OLS estimates from the regression of
price on a constant and four lags of price. Regression
results for copper are listed with asymptotic standard
errors in parentheses: 00 = 1.965 (1.474); 0, = 0.265
(0.073); e, = –0.371 (0.114); 03 = –0.014 (0.110); El,
= 0.099 (0.069); R* = 0.929; Durbin’s h = 0.00. The
AR(4) specification is an approximation that may not
represent any particular trader’s expectations. A con-
tinuum of possible expectation specifications exists,
and it is assumed that it can be well-approximated by
the two particular structureschosen. The results were
not especially sensitive to choice of lag length, first-
differencing, or various transformations. Corn and
wheat were treatedin thesame manneras copper, using
a constant and four lags of price.Frechette: Supply of Storage under Heterogeneous Expectations 469
Table 1. Copper Market Parameter Estimates Three Stage Least Squares 200 Observations
(Jan. 1975-Ott. 1991)
Sum of Ljung-Box
Expectation Squared Errors R-Squared Statistic
(16) Price difference 7,237 0.127 1,09
(17) Demand 138,898 0.357 0.73
Asymptotic One-tailed
Parameter Theoretical Value Estimate Std. Error P-value
a--quasi-rational share O<a<l 0.162 0.004 0.001
q—risk parameter ~>o 5.69 X 10-’ 0.24 X 10-5 0.001
K—marginal storage cost K>O –0.756 X 10-’ 1.26 X 10-’ 0.726
A-constant of integration A>O 1.75 x 10-~ 1.42 X 10-~ 0.109
~—demand constant 12.53 31.83 0.347
p,l-demand slope (p,) ~,<o –0.655 0.290 0.013
p,j-demand shifter(pal,) p,2>o 0.117 0.097 0.116
~t—demand shifter (pscrapt) P3>0 0.777 0.216
pq—demand shifter (y,)
0.001
p,4>o 0.420 0.271 0.061
~~—demand shifter (z,) 1.L5<0 –57.0 13.1 0.001
AR( 1)—demand shock 0.322 0.070 0.001
AR( 1)—price shock 0.295 0.072 0.001
are present, so equation (16) is estimated in
first-differenced form. The resulting residuals
are allowed to take on an AR(1) structure to
eliminate any bias in the estimated standard
errors due to the inclusion of generated re-
gressors in the form of estimated but unknown
quasi-rational expectations.
The theory is valid whether or not futures
markets exist. If futures prices are unbiased
predictors of future spot price, then the con-
temporaneous one-month ahead futures price
can be substituted for the realized future spot
price on the left-hand side of equation (16). If
futures prices are biased, then futures prices
are inappropriate.
Equation (5) expresses the rationally ex-
pected price in terms of predetermined vari-
ables: interest rate, price, stocks, and quasi-
rational expectations. The empirical version of
equation (5) is equation (16). The derivation
of (16) assumes an additive Gaussian error
structure, resulting in the rational forecast er-
ror term w~, based on Brownian motion odB.
All the variables on the right hand side of (16)
are predetermined. The error structure is de-
rived from an explicit Brownian motion as-
sumption rather than simply added to the end
of an estimating equation. The approach is
therefore more rigorous than others that ignore
the theory behind the error structure.
Equation (16) is estimated simultaneously
with the market demand curve to improve es-
timator efficiency, as done by Chavas, and to
test for model misspecification. Assume the
demand curve is:
(17) c, = p,, + ~,p, + p,,p:’ + p,3pyp + ~,y,
+ l-% + Vt>
where V[ is an AR(1) demand shock. Demand
shifters include the price of aluminum (p:]), the
price of scrap copper (p;c’’P), the index of in-
dustrial production (y,), and a dummy variable
(z,) equal to one during a mine strike and zero
otherwise. Estimation of equations (16) and
(17) was performed using three-stage least
squares (Zellner and Theil) to account for the
endogeneity of p, in (17),
Empirical Results
The results of estimating equations (16) and
(17) are shown in Table I. Of primary interest
are the estimates of a and q. Of secondary
interest are the demand curve parameters. If470 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
these estimates lie within their theoretically
valid ranges, then there is no econometric ev-
idence to contradict the claim that heteroge-
neous expectations are important in the United
States copper market. It maybe concluded that
heterogeneous expectations are a cause of rel-
ative backwardations during periods of low in-
ventories or when expectations differ widely
between fundamental traders and technical
traders. By extension, it may be generalized
that heterogeneous expectations cause relative
backwardations in other markets as well. The
empirical analysis will proceed by investigat-
ing two hypotheses about the parameters of
the model.
Hypothesis 1:
Null: a~() or a>l
Alternate: O<a <l.
The quasi-rational share parameter (a) is esti-
mated at 16.2 percent. The asymptotic stan-
dard error of the estimate is 0.4 percent, and
the asymptotic 95 percent confidence interval
for a is (15.4%, 20.0%). The asymptotic 95
percent confidence interval for the rational
share (1 – a) is (80.0%, 84.6%). Both inter-
vals lie within the (O, 1) boundary expected
for share parameters. The asymptotic one-
tailed p-values for the two sub-hypotheses, a
= O & a = 1, are both less than 0.001, so both
hypotheses can be rejected at the 99-percent
level. Therefore, the Null side of Hypothesis
1 is rejected at the 99-percent level of confi-




A positive value for the risk aversion pa-
rameter (@ indicates that traders are averse to
the risks generated by noise trading. A nega-
tive value indicates risk loving and invalidates
the theoretical results discussed previously.
The empirical estimate of q is 5.69 X 10-5
which equates to 2.85 percent per billion dol-
lars. Its asymptotic standard error is 0.12 per-
cent, and the asymptotic 95-percent confi-
dence interval for the parameter is (2.61%,
3.09%). The interval lies above zero, as ex-
pected. The asymptotic one-tailed p-value for
Hypothesis 2 is less than 0.001. Therefore the
Null side of Hypothesis 2 is rejected at the 99-
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The null hypothesis embodies the inequality
condition on equation (8). If the size of the
backwardation falls as stocks rise, then alp,/
ds,_, > 0 and the Null side of hypothesis 3
should be rejected. Hypothesis 3 can be tested
as a cross-equation parametric restriction in-
volving a, p,,, and K. Writing the Null in terms
of the structural parameters and rearranging
yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3‘:
Null: 2a[(30+ (t12 + OS + f3Jp* – K]
– p.,q(l + r*)(p*)3 = O
Alternate: 2a[t30+ (62 + & + tlJp* – K]
– plq(l + r*)(p*)3 >0
where asterisks (*) represent sample means.4
The estimated value of this nonlinear combi-
nation of parameters on the left-hand side of
the Null is 154.47 with an asymptotic standard
error of 63,56. The one-tailed asymptotic p-
value for the Null is 0.008. Therefore the Null
4Note thatD’(cf_, ) = Up,,, from equation (17). Pa-
rameterp, is negative, so thedirection of theinequality
switches from “<” in Hypothesis 3 to ‘<>” in Hy-
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side of Hypothesis 3‘ is rejected at a 99-per-
cent level of confidence, and the model is val-
idated.
Further validation of the model comes from
inspecting the parameter estimates from the
demand curve.5 The slope (p,]) of the inverse
demand curve is significantly negative at the
five-percent level. The prices of two substitute
goods (aluminum and scrap copper) are posi-
tive demand shifters, as is the index of indus-
trial production. The demand shifter parameter
estimates are statistically significant, jointly, at
the one-percent level with a Wald statistic of
16.78. The mine strike dummy is a demand
shifter representing additional substitution
away from copper during periods of market
unrest; its estimate is negative and statistically
significant. All are in accord with economic
theory.
The parameter estimates validate the theo-
retical model and provide interesting insight
into the United States copper market. In par-
ticular, rational market participants are shown
to outnumber quasi-rational market partici-
pants by five to one. This finding is very dif-
ferent from that of Chavas, who estimated
quasi-rational agents to outnumber rational
agents in the pork market by three to one. The
difference between these two findings may be
in (1) the data frequency (Chavas used annual
data.), (2) the sample period (Chavas used data
from 1960–1996.), or (3) the markets studied.
For further comparison, the model is ap-
plied to the corn and wheat markets. These
markets provide a good basis for comparison
to the copper market because backwardations
are common in the copper market but rare in
the grain markets. If backwardations are
caused by heterogeneity, then one should find
more homogeneity in the grain markets.
The quasi-rational share in the corn market
is estimated at 3.3 percent with an asymptotic
standard error of 4.1 percent, leaving the ra-
tional share at 96.7 percent. The null hypoth-
$The estimates for marginal storage costs (K) and
the constant of integration (A) have relatively large
standarderrors and are not statistically different from
zero at theten-percentlevel. In theory, both parameters
should be positive.
esis that there are no quasi-rational agents can-
not be rejected by the asymptotic t-test (t =
0.8 1), and the relative number of quasi-ratio-
nal agents is small. The quasi-rational share in
the wheat market was 1.2 percent with an as-
ymptotic standard error of 0.065 percent, leav-
ing the rational share at 98.8 percent. The null
hypothesis that there are no quasi-rational
agents can be rejected by the asymptotic t-test
(t = 18.25), but the relative number of quasi-
rational agents is small.
The risk aversion measures in these two
markets are 9.41 percent per billion dollars for
the corn market with an asymptotic standard
error of 3.53 percent per billion dollars and
0.046 percent per billion dollars for the wheat
market with an asymptotic standard error of
0.088 percent per billion dollars. The corn
measure exceeds the copper measure (2.85 %),
but the wheat estimate is considerably smaller.
There are several implications of these re-
sults. First, the grain markets both have low
estimated shares of quasi-rational participants
compared to the copper market. The model
predicts that such markets should experience
backwardations infrequently compared to cop-
per, and they do.
Second, the risk-aversion level in the wheat
market is low, compared to that for the copper
and corn markets. In addition, the share of
quasi-rational traders is estimated at only 1.2
percent. The implication is that the risk neutral
representative agent model may be a good ap-
proximation for analyzing the wheat market.
The corn market’s share of quasi-rational trad-
ers is slightly higher than that of wheat but
statistically insignificant, implying that the
risk neutral representative agent model may be
a good approximation for the corn market
also. The implication is not as strong as it is
for the wheat market. The 16-percent quasi-
rational share in the copper market indicates
that a risk neutral representative agent model
may be a poor approximation for analyzing
the copper market. All three markets are much
more rational than indicated by Chavas’s re-
sults for the hog market (73 ’70quasi-rational),
for which the risk-neutral representative agent
model mav be a verv Door armroximation.472 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
Conclusion
This paper develops a structural model of the
supply of storage under heterogeneous expec-
tations. In the model, stocks and expected re-
turns are positively related, in accord with em-
pirical evidence. Stock holding during a
futures backwardation is explained as follows.
When stocks are low, the rationally expected
excess return falls below zero. Quasi-rational
agents take a long position in the market, and
rational agents sell stocks short to maintain
equilibrium. Rational agents cannot drive up
the spot-futures basis because quasi-rational
agents drive it back down below the full costs
of carry to the heterogeneous expectations
equilibrium.
An important result of the theoretical mod-
el is that aggregate stock levels and rational
price expectations are positively related. Pre-
vious empirical work on this subject has
shown that price expectations fall as stock lev-
els decrease and rise as stock levels increase.
Rational speculators, therefore, expect higher
returns to storage when stock levels are high.
The heterogeneous expectations model offers
a new explanation for this empirical phenom-
enon.
Despite the empirical weakness of the fully
rational expectations hypothesis in some pre-
vious studies, eighty-four percent of market
participants are shown to trade rationally in
the copper market. Sixteen percent trade qua-
si-rationally. Quasi-rational traders are not
driven out of the market fast enough to dis-
appear entirely, and their behavior influences
the actions of rational traders. Backwardations
arise from the resulting market equilibrium.
The corn and wheat markets provide fur-
ther evidence in favor of the rational represen-
tative agent approach. Estimates indicate that
only 3.3 percent of corn market participants
and 1.2 percent of wheat market participants
are quasi-rational, leaving the vast majority as
rational in both markets. The low share of qua-
si-rational participants in these markets cor-
responds to the low frequency of backwarda-
tions.
This paper considers a partial equilibrium
model with only one stochastic asset price. If
market participants invest in multiple related
markets with correlated stochastic prices that
are changing continuously, then a significant
portfolio diversification element may be evi-
dent in market behavior. More theoretical
work is needed to address the issue of port-
folio diversification within the framework of
heterogeneous expectations.
Different expectation formation processes
often imply very different market behaviors.
Changes in the share of quasi-rational traders
in a market can change the way the market
behaves. One might expect that cheap and
easy access to information from public sources
including Internet sites and extension services
might contribute to a gradual increase in the
rationality of a market. On the other hand, the
prevalence of commodity pools and comput-
erized trading may drive the trend toward
noise trading. The distinction is an important
one requiring more study and prescriptive ap-
plications. Further analysis is required to de-
termine the tangible effects of heterogeneity
on market participants.
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